

# CKKS PERFORMANCE

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# POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO

~~Integer Factorization~~

~~Given  $N = p \cdot q$ , find  $p$  and  $q$~~

~~Discrete Logarithm~~

~~Given  $g$  and  $k * g$ , find  $k$   
( $g$  lives in some algebraic group)~~

Lattices  
Codes  
Systems of quad. Equations  
Isogenies  
Hash functions

# POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO


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# POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO: BEYOND BASIC PRIMITIVES


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
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


Public key encr.: Kyber/ML-KEM

Signatures: Dilithium/ML-SIG & Falcon

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
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## New cryptographic functionality

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)

- Only possible with lattices
- Post-quantum security

# FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



**Fully homomorphic encryption** (FHE) enables arbitrary computations on encrypted data

An FHE has four algorithms:

1. KeyGen:  $\cdot \mapsto \text{pk}, \text{sk}, \text{evk}$
2. Enc:  $\text{pk}, m \mapsto c$
3. Dec:  $\text{sk}, c \mapsto m$
4. Eval:  $\text{evk}, (c_i)_{i=1..k}, f \mapsto c$


**Correctness:**

For any circuit  $f$ , for any  $m_1, \dots, m_k$  (with  $k$  the arity of  $f$ )

$$\text{Dec} \left( \text{Eval} \left( \left( \text{Enc}(m_i) \right)_{i=1..k}; f \right) \right) = f(m_1, \dots, m_k)$$

# OUTSOURCING COMPUTATIONS

“Trust-based” solution




Server sees the data




# OUTSOURCING COMPUTATIONS

## “Trust-based” solution



Server sees the data

## FHE-based solution



Server does not see the data

# KEY PROPERTIES OF FHE

Computations are as **exact** encrypted as in plaintexts  
[Unlike differential privacy or digital twins]

**No interactions**

[Unlike MPC]

**Ciphertexts can be reused**

[Unlike MPC]

Security holds under **well-established hardness assumptions**  
[Unlike “Confidential Computing”]

# KEY USES OF FHE

**Externalization** of computations while protecting confidentiality

- Heavy computations
- Complex computations
- Proprietary computations

Protection of **databases** that need processing

- ⇒ Hacking the database server becomes useless
- ⇒ Sensitive databases can be externalized

**Collaboration** between entities wishing to protect their own input data  
(Requires Threshold-FHE)

Protection of **internal data** against insiders/hackers

# FHE IS KICKING OFF


2009: first solution (Gentry) → totally impractical

Now: many libraries → practical for many computations

Soon: hardware accelerations

Next year(?): ISO/IEC standard

- ❖ Privacy-preserving medical services
- ❖ Privacy-preserving database queries
- ❖ Privacy-preserving smart contracts on blockchain
- ❖ And more to be found



# MAIN FHE SCHEMES

	Plaintext space	Native operations
BFV/BGV (2012)	$(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})^{N/k}$	Add, Mult in // Coord. rotation
DM/CGGI (2015)	$\{0,1\}$	Binary gates
CKKS (2017)	$\mathbb{C}^{N/2}$	Add, Mult, Conj in // Coord. rotation

First realization by Gentry (2009)

First efficient libraries: SEAL, HELIB  
(~2015)

# CKKS PLAINTEXTS AND OPS

CKKS is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme:

$$\forall f, m_1, \dots, m_k : \text{Dec} \left( \text{Eval} \left( f; \text{Enc}(m_1), \dots, \text{Enc}(m_k) \right) \right) \approx f(m_1, \dots, m_k)$$

**Plaintext space: vectors of  $\mathbb{C}^{N/2}$  (up to some precision)**

- add in //
- multiply in //
- conjugate in //
- rotate the coordinates

CKKS is **level-based**

- mult consumes 1 level
- add, conj & rot consume 0 level
- bootstrapping (BTS) regains level

# BOOTSTRAPPING EFFICIENCY

$N = 2^{16}$ Precision $\approx 22$ bits Remaining levels: 13	CPU Single-thread, AVX512 Intel Xeon Gold 6342 @2.8GHz
Real-BTS ( $N/2$ real numbers)	<b>5.3 s</b>
Complex-BTS ( $N/2$ complex numbers or $N$ real numbers)	<b>6.9 s</b>

HEaaN library, binaries available at [heaan.it](https://heaan.it)

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Real-BTS ( $N/2$ real numbers)	<b>5.3 s</b>	<b>49 ms</b>
Complex-BTS ( $N/2$ complex numbers or $N$ real numbers)	<b>6.9 s</b>	<b>61 ms</b>

HEaaN library, binaries available at [heaan.it](https://heaan.it)



# AMORTIZED COMPUTATIONAL COST

Cost of a ct-ct multiplication, amortized over:

- slots
- a full BTS loop iteration
- several ciphertexts

*73.6 ns*

( GPU, NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090 )

# LLAMA2-7B... HOMOMORPHICALLY!

One of Meta's transformer-based LLMs (with  $2^7$  tokens)



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RMSNorm

dim =  $2^7$

$2^{12}$  in //



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RMSNorm	$\text{dim} = 2^7$	$2^{12}$ in //
pt-ct matrix mult	$2^{12} \times 2^{12} \times 2^7$	3 in //

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pt-ct matrix mult	$2^{12} \times 2^{12} \times 2^7$	once
RMSNorm	$\text{dim} = 2^7$	$2^{12}$ in //
pt-ct matrix mult	$2^{13.4} \times 2^{12} \times 2^7$	2 in //

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Repeat 32 times (!#?!!)

And more of the same for each generated token

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**1 token**  $\approx 2^{42}$  **bit ops**

**For the sake of comparison:**

**AES**  $\approx 2^{14}$  **bit ops**

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Vanilla CKKS  
with 8 GPUs

=> 181.5 s <=

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CKKS is usually thought of as designed for **real/complex numbers**  
But it can be used for **binary** computations! [DMPS24]

Bootstrapping can be optimized for such plaintext formats [BCKS24,BKSS24]



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	CGGI	[DMPS24]	[BCKS24]	[BKSS24]	In a few months?
Throughput (amortized time / binary gate) <b>single-thread CPU</b>	~10ms	92.6 $\mu$ s	17.6 $\mu$ s	7.39 $\mu$ s	3 $\mu$ s

(with GPU, it's 100x faster!)

# WRAPPING UP

## Usecase performance cheatsheet (GPU)

Facial recognition of 1 out of 250K: ~0.2s

Simple CNN (Resnet18, Facenet): ~1s

Training for image classification: a few mins  
(demo available at <https://autofhe.com/> )

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# ANY QUESTIONS?