Thesis defense
Side-channel
PhD Defense : Jérémy GUILLAUME
Abstract: This thesis studies the challenges of implementing a screaming-channel attack: an attack exploiting the electromagnetic leakage and mixed-signal nature (analog and digital parts on the same silicon die) of a victim system to extract its secret data at a distance of several meters. In particular, Jeremy Guillaume explored various methods enabling an attacker to increase the vulnerability of screaming channels, revealing attack surfaces for which countermeasures need to be deployed. This thesis proposes a new synchronization method enabling a security auditor to synchronize electromagnetic leakage observations directly from the captured signals. Jeremy Guillaume's work has also highlighted the existence of data leakage at non-harmonic frequencies, i.e., at frequencies where such leakage had not previously been observed. Finally, this thesis demonstrates that leakage collected at different frequencies can be combined to increase system vulnerability, and that even complex circuits with countermeasures against screaming channels (like the RFSoC from Xilinx) exhibit electromagnetic emissions correlated with their data. These various contributions provide a better understanding of the screaming channels and how they can threaten our
system.
Optimizing data leakage exploitation in the context of screaming-channel attack, Jérémy GUILLAUME
PhD Directed by M. Maxime PELCAT and M. Amor NAFKHA
The jury:
M. Guy GOGNIAT, Université de Bretagne Sud
M. Lilian BOSSUET, Université Jean Monnet
Ms Nele MENTENS, Leiden University
M. Philippe BESNIER, INSA de Rennes
M Fakhreddine GHAFFARI, CY Cergy Paris Université
M. Rubén SALVADOR, CentraleSupélec
M. Amor NAFKHA, CentraleSupélec
M. Maxime PELCAT, INSA de Rennes