Description
Consider a set of $n$ players, each holding a value $x_1,...,x_n$, and an $n$-ary function $f$, specified as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field. How can the players compute $y=f(x_1,...,x_n)$ in such a way that no (small enough) set of dishonest players obtains any joint information about the input values of the honest players (beyond of what they can infer from $y$)? In this talk, we present a protocol that allows the players to compute an arbitrary function $f$, such that any subset of up to $t< n/2$ dishonest players do not obtain any information about the other players' inputs.<br/> Finally, we briefly sketch an extension of the protocol, which guarantees the correctness of the outcome even when the dishonest players misbehave in arbitrary manner.
Next sessions
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MIKE: An efficient and compact NIKE Based on a Commutative Monoidal Action
Speaker : Jonathan Komada Eriksen - COSIC, KU Leuven
Robert recently described a powerful correspondence between certain (Hermitian) modules and (polarized) abelian varieties, which simultaneously generalizes both the class-group action underlying protocols such as CSIDH, and the Deuring correspondence, underlying protocols such as SQIsign. Using this correspondence, he also proposed how to construct a post-quantum NIKE, called MIKE, which, at a[…]-
Cryptography
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TBA
Speaker : Anmoal Porwal - Technical University of Munich
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Cryptography
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Asymmetric primitive
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