Description
We introduce key reinstallation attacks (KRACKs). These attacks abuse features of a protocol to reinstall an already in-use key, thereby resetting nonces and/or replay counters associated to this key. We show that our novel attack technique breaks several handshakes that are used in a WPA2-protected network.<br/> All protected Wi-Fi networks use the 4-way handshake to generate fresh session keys. The design of this handshake was proven secure, and over its 14-year lifetime no weaknesses have been found in it. However, contrary to this history, we show that the 4-way handshake is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks. In such an attack, the adversary tricks a victim into reinstalling an already in-use key. This is achieved by manipulating and replaying handshake messages. When the victim reinstalls the key, the associated incremental nonce and replay counter is reset to its initial value. Apart from breaking the 4-way handshake, we also show that our key reinstallation attack breaks the group key and Fast BSS Transition (FT) handshake. The impact of our attacks depend on both the handshake being targeted, and the data-confidentiality protocol in use. Simplified, against AES-CCMP, an adversary can replay and decrypt packets, but cannot forge packets. Still, this makes it possible to hijack TCP streams and inject malicious data into them. Against WPA-TKIP and GCMP, the impact is catastrophic: an adversary can replay, decrypt, and forge arbitrary packets. Rather surprisingly, GCMP is especially affected because it uses the same authentication key in both communication directions. Finally, we confirmed our findings in practice, and found that every Wi-Fi device is vulnerable to some variant of our attacks. Notably, our attack is exceptionally devastating against Android and Linux: it forces the client into using a predictable all-zero encryption key.
Next sessions
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European Cyber Week: atelier cryptographie post-quantique
Dans la continuité des éditions 2021, 2022 et 2024, la DGA — en partenariat avec CREACH LABS et avec le soutien de l'ANSSI, de l'IRISA, de l'IRMAR et du Pôle d'Excellence Cyber — organise la 4e édition de l'atelier consacré à la cryptographie post-quantique dans le cadre de l'European Cyber Week 2026. Attention, il faut s'inscrire (gratuitement) au préalable — s'inscrire à la conférence Les[…] -
Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)