Description
Supersingular isogeny graphs have been used in the Charles–Goren–Lauter cryptographic hash function and the supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) protocole of De\,Feo and Jao. A recently proposed alternative to SIDH is the commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman (CSIDH) protocole, in which the isogeny graph is first restricted to $\FF_p$-rational curves $E$ and $\FF_p$-rational isogenies then oriented by the quadratic subring $\ZZ[\pi] \subset \End(E)$ generated by the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: E \rightarrow E$. We introduce a general notion of orienting supersingular elliptic curves and their isogenies, and use this as the basis to construct a general oriented supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (OSIDH) protocole.<br/> By imposing the data of an orientation by an imaginary quadratic ring $\OO$, we obtain an augmented category of supersingular curves on which the class group $\Cl(\OO)$ acts faithfully and transitively. This idea is already implicit in the CSIDH protocol, in which supersingular curves over $\FF_p$ are oriented by the Frobenius subring $\ZZ[\pi] \simeq \ZZ[\sqrt{-p}]$. In contrast we consider an elliptic curve $E_0$ oriented by a CM order $\OO_K$ of class number one. To obtain a nontrivial group action, we consider $\ell$-isogeny chains, on which the class group of an order $\OO$ of large index $\ell^n$ in $\OO_K$ acts, a structure we call a whirlpool. The map from $\ell$-isogeny chains to its terminus forgets the structure of the orientation, and the original base curve $E_0$, giving rise to a generic supersingular elliptic curve. Within this general framework we define a new oriented supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (OSIDH) protocol, which has fewer restrictions on the proportion of supersingular curves covered and on the torsion group structure of the underlying curves. Moreover, the group action can be carried out effectively solely on the sequences of moduli points (such as $j$-invariants) on a modular curve, thereby avoiding expensive isogeny computations, and is further amenable to speedup by precomputations of endomorphisms on the base curve $E_0$.<br/> lien: http://desktop.visio.renater.fr/scopia?ID=721072***2120&autojoin
Next sessions
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European Cyber Week: atelier cryptographie post-quantique
Dans la continuité des éditions 2021, 2022 et 2024, la DGA — en partenariat avec CREACH LABS et avec le soutien de l'ANSSI, de l'IRISA, de l'IRMAR et du Pôle d'Excellence Cyber — organise la 4e édition de l'atelier consacré à la cryptographie post-quantique dans le cadre de l'European Cyber Week 2026. Attention, il faut s'inscrire (gratuitement) au préalable — s'inscrire à la conférence Les[…] -
Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)