Table of contents

  • This session has been presented September 20, 2019.

Description

  • Speaker

    Thomas Prest - PqShield

In the last decade, several works have focused on finding the best way to model circuit leakage in order to obtain provably secure implementations. One of the most realistic models is the noisy leakage model, introduced in (Prouff, Rivain'13) and (Duc-Dziembowski-Faust'14) together with secure constructions. These works suffer from various limitations, in particular the use of ideal leak-free gates in (Prouff, Rivain'13) and an important loss (in the size of the field) in the reduction in (Duc-Dziembowski-Faust'14). In this work, we provide new strategies to prove the security of masked implementations and start by unifying the different noisiness metrics used in prior works by relating all of them to a standard notion in information theory: the pointwise mutual information. Based on this new interpretation, we define two new natural metrics and analyze the security of known compilers with respect to these metrics. In particular, we prove (1) a tighter bound for reducing the noisy leakage models to the probing model using our first new metric, (2) better bounds for amplification-based security proofs using the second metric. To support that the improvements we obtain are not only a consequence of the use of alternative metrics, we show that for a concrete representation of leakage (e.g, "Hamming weight + Gaussian noise''), our approach significantly improves the parameters compared to prior works. Finally, using the Rényi divergence, we quantify concretely the advantage of an adversary in attacking a block cipher depending on the number of leakage acquisitions available to it. (Joint work with Dahmun Goudarzi, Ange Martinelli and Alain Passelègue.)<br/> lien: http://desktop.visio.renater.fr/scopia?ID=723809***3489&autojoin

Next sessions

  • Polytopes in the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts Paradigm

    • November 29, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Hugo Beguinet - ENS Paris / Thales

    The Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm (FSwA) uses rejection sampling to remove a secret’s dependency on a given source distribution.&nbsp; Recent results revealed that unlike the uniform distribution in the hypercube, both the continuous Gaussian and the uniform distribution within the hypersphere minimise the rejection rate and the size of the proof of knowledge. However, in practice both these[…]
    • Cryptography

    • Asymmetric primitive

    • Mode and protocol

  • Post-quantum Group-based Cryptography

    • December 20, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Delaram Kahrobaei - The City University of New York

Show previous sessions