Description
We present a technique for the verification of cryptographic protocols, based on an abstract representation of the protocol by a set of Horn clauses, and on a resolution algorithm on these clauses. This technique allows a flexible encoding of many cryptographic primitives. It can verify a wide range of security properties of the protocols, such as secrecy, authenticity, and limited cases of process equivalences, in a fully automatic way. Furthermore, the obtained security proofs are valid for an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, in parallel or not.
Prochains exposés
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Key Attack on the ACDGV Matrix Encryption Scheme
Orateur : Anmoal Porwal - Technical University of Munich
I will present our key-recovery attack on the ACDGV public-key encryption scheme proposed at ASIACRYPT 2024 by Aragon, Couvreur, Dyseryn, Gaborit, and Vinçotte. The secret key is a Gabidulin code hidden by appending random rows and columns and by left- and right-multiplication with invertible matrices. Our attack exploits the resulting algebraic structure to recover an equivalent secret key. It[…]-
Cryptography
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Asymmetric primitive
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Module Learning With Errors and Structured Extrapolated Dihedral Cosets
Orateur : Jinwei Zheng - Télécom Paris
The Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) problem is the fundamental hardness assumption underlying the key encapsulation and signature schemes ML-KEM and ML-DSA, which have been selected by NIST for post-quantum cryptography standardization. Understanding its quantum hardness is crucial for assessing the security of these standardized schemes. Inspired by the equivalence between LWE and[…]-
Cryptography
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