Description
In a recent series of papers, Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich (et al.) presented a number of related-key attacks on AES and reduced-round versions of AES. The most impressive of these were presented at Asiacrypt 2009: related-key attacks against the full AES-256 and AES-192. The publication of these attacks has led some people to question the security of AES.<br/> While we agree that the related-key attacks are valid attacks and they could have been avoided in the design, we give arguments why their practical relevance is limited.<br/> In this presentation we discuss the applicability of these attacks, and of related-key attacks in general. We model the access of the attacker to the key in the form of key access schemes and remind the listeners of the following two facts. First, as shown by Mihir Bellare and Tadayoshi Kohno, there are key access schemes that are inherently insecure. We call those key access schemes unsound and propose related-key attacks should only be considered with respect to sound key access schemes. Second, as shown by a.o. Eli Biham and Serge Vaudenay, even the presence of a sound key access scheme inevitably leads to erosion of security.
Prochains exposés
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Verification of Rust Cryptographic Implementations with Aeneas
Orateur : Aymeric Fromherz - Inria
From secure communications to online banking, cryptography is the cornerstone of most modern secure applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic design and implementation is notoriously error-prone, with a long history of design flaws, implementation bugs, and high-profile attacks. To address this issue, several projects proposed the use of formal verification techniques to statically ensure the[…] -
On the average hardness of SIVP for module lattices of fixed rank
Orateur : Radu Toma - Sorbonne Université
In joint work with Koen de Boer, Aurel Page, and Benjamin Wesolowski, we study the hardness of the approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP) for random module lattices. We use here a natural notion of randomness as defined originally by Siegel through Haar measures. By proving a reduction, we show it is essentially as hard as the problem for arbitrary instances. While this was[…] -
Endomorphisms via Splittings
Orateur : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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