Description
Authentication protocols, run between a prover and a verifier, allow the verifier to check the legitimacy of the prover. A legitimate prover should always authenticate (the correctness requirement), while illegitimate parties (adversaries) should not authenticate (the soundness or impersonation resistance requirement). Secure authentication protocols thwart most Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) attacks, such as replays, but they do not prevent relay attacks , where a coalition of two adversaries, a leech and a ghost , forwards messages between an honest verifier and an honest, far-away prover so as to let the illegitimate ghost authenticate.<br/> Distance-bounding protocols strengthen the security of authentication so as to prevent pure relaying, by enabling the verifier to upper-bound his distance to the prover. This is done by adding a number of time-critical challenge-response rounds, where bits are exchanged over a fast channel; the verifier measures the challenge-response roundtrip and compares it to a time-based proximity bound. There are four attacks such protocols should prevent: mafia fraud, where a MIM adversary tries to authenticate in the presence of a far-away (honest) prover, without purely relaying messages (the clock prevents this); terrorist fraud, where the prover is dishonest and helps the MIM adversary authenticate insofar as this help does not give the adversary any advantage for future (unaided) authentication; distance fraud, where a far-away prover wants to prove he is within the verifier's proximity; and (lazy-round) impersonation security, requiring a degree of impersonation security even for the exchanges that are not timed. Constructing distance-bounding protocols is a highly non-trivial task, since often providing security against one requirement creates a vulnerability with respect to a different requirement. I propose to describe how to construct distance-bounding protocols which are probably secure and also guarantee the prover's privacy.
Prochains exposés
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On the average hardness of SIVP for module lattices of fixed rank
Orateur : Radu Toma - Sorbonne Université
In joint work with Koen de Boer, Aurel Page, and Benjamin Wesolowski, we study the hardness of the approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP) for random module lattices. We use here a natural notion of randomness as defined originally by Siegel through Haar measures. By proving a reduction, we show it is essentially as hard as the problem for arbitrary instances. While this was[…] -
Attacks and Remedies for Randomness in AI: Cryptanalysis of PHILOX and THREEFRY
Orateur : Yevhen Perehuda - Ruhr-University Bochum
In this work, we address the critical yet understudied question of the security of the most widely deployed pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) in AI applications. We show that these generators are vulnerable to practical and low-cost attacks. With this in mind, we conduct an extensive survey of randomness usage in current applications to understand the efficiency requirements imposed in[…]-
Cryptography
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Lightweight (AND, XOR) Implementations of Large-Degree S-boxes
Orateur : Marie Bolzer - LORIA
The problem of finding a minimal circuit to implement a given function is one of the oldest in electronics. In cryptography, the focus is on small functions, especially on S-boxes which are classically the only non-linear functions in iterated block ciphers. In this work, we propose new ad-hoc automatic tools to look for lightweight implementations of non-linear functions on up to 5 variables for[…]-
Cryptography
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Symmetrical primitive
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Implementation of cryptographic algorithm
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Algorithms for post-quantum commutative group actions
Orateur : Marc Houben - Inria Bordeaux
At the historical foundation of isogeny-based cryptography lies a scheme known as CRS; a key exchange protocol based on class group actions on elliptic curves. Along with more efficient variants, such as CSIDH, this framework has emerged as a powerful building block for the construction of advanced post-quantum cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, all protocols in this line of work are[…] -
Endomorphisms via Splittings
Orateur : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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