Description
Elise Barelli et Alain Couvreur ont présenté une attaque dévastatrice sur le cryptosystème DAGS soumis au 1er tour de la compétition du NIST autour d'algorithmes de cryptographie post-quantiques. Je présenterai une explication précise de la résolution par bases de Gröbner de leur modélisation algébrique, expliquant l'efficacité de l'attaque pour les paramètres de DAGS publiés au NIST.<br/> lien: http://desktop.visio.renater.fr/scopia?ID=722270***9231&autojoin
Prochains exposés
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Dual attacks in code-based (and lattice-based) cryptography
Orateur : Charles Meyer-Hilfiger - Inria Rennes
The hardness of the decoding problem and its generalization, the learning with errors problem, are respectively at the heart of the security of the Post-Quantum code-based scheme HQC and the lattice-based scheme Kyber. Both schemes are to be/now NIST standards. These problems have been actively studied for decades, and the complexity of the state-of-the-art algorithms to solve them is crucially[…]-
Cryptography
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Lie algebras and the security of cryptosystems based on classical varieties in disguise
Orateur : Mingjie Chen - KU Leuven
In 2006, de Graaf et al. proposed a strategy based on Lie algebras for finding a linear transformation in the projective linear group that connects two linearly equivalent projective varieties defined over the rational numbers. Their method succeeds for several families of “classical” varieties, such as Veronese varieties, which are known to have large automorphism groups. In this talk, we[…]-
Cryptography
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