Description
*Abstract:* Fault attacks are considered among critical threat to embedded cryptography. This talk will be divided into in two parts. The first part of the talk will explore application of faults on advanced security primitives. We present persistent fault analysis introduced at CHES 2017 and its capability to bypass state of the art fault countermeasures as well as higher-order masking with one and only one fault injection. Further, we present novel exploits in lattice based post-quantum cryptographic primitives with one (or few) faults. The second part of the talk will present, to our knowledge, the first practical combined side-channel and differential fault attacks. With application to bit permutation based ciphers like PRESENT and GIFT, practical attacks exploiting laser fault injection with power side-channel will be presented.
*Biography :* Shivam Bhasin is a Senior Research Scientist and Programme manager (Cryptographic engineering) Centre for Hardware Assurance in Temasek laboratories, Nanyang Technical University (TL@NTU), Singapore since 2015. His research interests include embedded security, trusted computing and secure designs. He received his PhD from Telecom Paristech in 2011, Master’s from Mines Saint-Etienne, France in 2008. Before NTU, Shivam held position of Research Engineer in Institut Mines-Telecom, France. He was also a visiting researcher at UCL, Belgium (2011) and Kobe University, Japan (2013). Shivam also taught hardware security as an Adjunct Professor in IIT, Kharagpur, India (2018). He regularly publishes at top peer reviewed journals and conferences. Some of his research now also forms a part of ISO/IEC 17825 standard.
Prochains exposés
-
Cryptanalytical extraction of complex Neural Networks in black-box settings
Orateur : Benoit COQUERET - INRIA, Thales CESTI
With the widespread development of artifical intelligence, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have become valuable intellectual property (IP). In the past few years, software and hardware-based attacks targetting at the weights of the DNN have been introduced allowing potential attacker to gain access to a near-perfect copy of the victim's model. However, these attacks either fail against more complex[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Machine learning
-
-
Advanced techniques for fault injection attacks on integrated circuits
Orateur : Paul Grandamme - Laboratoire Hubert Curien, Université Jean Monnet
The security of integrated circuits is evaluated through the implementation of attacks that exploit their inherent hardware vulnerabilities. Fault injection attacks represent a technique that is commonly employed for this purpose. These techniques permit an attacker to alter the nominal operation of the component in order to obtain confidential information. Firstly, we propose the utilisation of[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Fault injection
-
-
Anomalies Mitigation for Horizontal Side Channel Attacks with Unsupervised Neural Networks
Orateur : Gauthier Cler - SERMA Safety & Security
The success of horizontal side-channel attacks heavily depends on the quality of the traces as well as the correct extraction of interest areas, which are expected to contain relevant leakages. If former is insufficient, this will consequently degrade the identification capability of potential leakage candidates and often render attacks inapplicable. This work assess the relevance of neural[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Machine learning
-
-
Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Orateur : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Hardware reverse
-