Sommaire

  • Cet exposé a été présenté le 02 février 2018.

Description

  • Orateur

    Ioana Boureanu (University of Surrey)

HB+ is a well-know authentication scheme purposely designed to be lightweight. However, HB+ is vulnerable to a key-recovery, man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack dubbed GRS. To this end, at WiSec2015, the HB+DB protocol added a distance-bounding dimension to HB+, which was experimentally shown to counteract the GRS attack.In this talk, we will exhibit however a number of security flaws in the HB+DB protocol. Some attacks are authentication-driven, others relate to distance-bounding. What is more, we will show that a small refinement on the GRS-strategy still leads to key-recovery in HB+DB, un-deterred by its distance-bounding dimension. We will also propose a new distance-bounding protocol called BLOG, which is based on HB+DB but which is provably secure, enjoys better (asymptotical) security and is more lightweight.

Infos pratiques

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