Description
The security of cryptographic systems such as Kyber and Dilithium (currently undergoing standardization by NIST) fundamentally hinges on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. However, the state of the art for attacking this problem is not yet entirely clear. Specifically, the validity of dual attacks on LWE is currently under scrutiny due to their analyses relying on heuristics that have proven to be inaccurate. Notably, an assumption of independence introduces an error in the counting of false positives. Nevertheless, there is hope for dual attacks. It is feasible to rectify their analyses to accurately account for false positives, demonstrating that their impact on attack complexity is negligible.
Prochains exposés
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Séminaire C2 à INRIA Paris
Emmanuel Thomé et Pierrick Gaudry; Rachelle Heim Boissier; Épiphane Nouetowa; Dung Bui. Plus d'infos sur https://seminaire-c2.inria.fr/ -
Attacking the Supersingular Isogeny Problem: From the Delfs–Galbraith algorithm to oriented graphs
Orateur : Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy - COSIC, KU Leuven
The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In[…]-
Cryptography
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