Description
The security of integrated circuits is evaluated through the implementation of attacks that exploit their inherent hardware vulnerabilities. Fault injection attacks represent a technique that is commonly employed for this purpose. These techniques permit an attacker to alter the nominal operation of the component in order to obtain confidential information.
Firstly, we propose the utilisation of the thermal effect of an infrared laser bench for the injection of permanent faults into the Flash memory of unpowered components. This novel attack vector gives rise to the delineation of a comprehensive new fault model, encompassing both the physical and application levels.
Secondly, we describe the use of unfocused X-ray sources for the injection of faults into the Flash memories of both powered and unpowered components. Furthermore, the thermal and temporal recovery phenomena are also characterised. The design and characterisation of masks that enable the focused injection of faults are demonstrated.
These novel attacks on unpowered devices, facilitated by fault injection using X-rays and lasers, necessitate a re-evaluation of the effectiveness of protection mechanisms against such attacks, particularly in regard to these novel attack vectors.