Description
Data-centric applications such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (IoT) impose increasingly stringent demands on the performance, the security and the energy efficiency of modern computing architectures. Traditional approaches are often unable to keep pace with these requirements making necessary to explore innovative paradigms such as in-memory computing. This paradigm is particularly promising as it minimizes the data movement between memory and processing units, one of the most important bottleneck in conventional systems. Ferroelectric transistors (FeFETs) are at the forefront of this innovation, pushing the boundaries by enabling the development of intrinsically non-volatile logic gates. These gates enables tight integration of memory and logic. This concept is known as Logic in Memory (LiM) and offers a significant reduction of energy consumption while improving computational speed at the same time.
However, the transition from concept to application is far from easy and a lot of challenges have yet to be overcome. Designing non-volatile logic gates is just the first step; these components must also be integrated into complete, functioning architectures capable of handling complex operations, such as cryptographic algorithms. The methodology we propose addresses these challenges by outlining a process for designing such operations using FeFETs, embedding them within a full-scale computing framework, and rigorously evaluating their performance and benefits. Furthermore, the development of these LiM structures raises new issues in logic synthesis, requiring the adaptation of existing synthesis tools or the creation of new ones. Addressing these challenges is crucial for the successful implementation of LiM-based systems in real-world applications.
Practical infos
Next sessions
-
Cryptanalytical extraction of complex Neural Networks in black-box settings
Speaker : Benoit COQUERET - INRIA, Thales CESTI
With the widespread development of artifical intelligence, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have become valuable intellectual property (IP). In the past few years, software and hardware-based attacks targetting at the weights of the DNN have been introduced allowing potential attacker to gain access to a near-perfect copy of the victim's model. However, these attacks either fail against more complex[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Machine learning
-
-
Advanced techniques for fault injection attacks on integrated circuits
Speaker : Paul Grandamme - Laboratoire Hubert Curien, Université Jean Monnet
The security of integrated circuits is evaluated through the implementation of attacks that exploit their inherent hardware vulnerabilities. Fault injection attacks represent a technique that is commonly employed for this purpose. These techniques permit an attacker to alter the nominal operation of the component in order to obtain confidential information. Firstly, we propose the utilisation of[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Fault injection
-
-
Anomalies Mitigation for Horizontal Side Channel Attacks with Unsupervised Neural Networks
Speaker : Gauthier Cler - SERMA Safety & Security
The success of horizontal side-channel attacks heavily depends on the quality of the traces as well as the correct extraction of interest areas, which are expected to contain relevant leakages. If former is insufficient, this will consequently degrade the identification capability of potential leakage candidates and often render attacks inapplicable. This work assess the relevance of neural[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Machine learning
-
-
Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Speaker : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Hardware reverse
-