Table of contents

  • This session has been presented March 19, 2021.

Description

  • Speaker

    Joseph Gravellier

In this talk, we will discuss software-induced hardware attacks and their impact for IoT, cloud and mobile security. More specifically, I will introduce SideLine, a new power side-channel attack vector that can be triggered remotely to infer cryptographic secrets. SideLine is based on the intentional misuse of delay-lines components embedded in SoCs that use external memory. I will explain how we exploit the delay-line relationship with on-chip power consumption to capture side-channel leakage, how we collect and store this information and how we use it to conduct power side-channel attacks. Different scenarios will be discussed along with the feasibility of remote hardware attacks in various scenarios.

Next sessions

  • Cryptanalytical extraction of complex Neural Networks in black-box settings

    • March 28, 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Speaker : Benoit COQUERET - INRIA, Thales CESTI

    With the widespread development of artifical intelligence, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have become valuable intellectual property (IP). In the past few years, software and hardware-based attacks targetting at the weights of the DNN have been introduced allowing potential attacker to gain access to a near-perfect copy of the victim's model. However, these attacks either fail against more complex[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Machine learning

  • Advanced techniques for fault injection attacks on integrated circuits

    • April 25, 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Speaker : Paul Grandamme - Laboratoire Hubert Curien, Université Jean Monnet

    The security of integrated circuits is evaluated through the implementation of attacks that exploit their inherent hardware vulnerabilities. Fault injection attacks represent a technique that is commonly employed for this purpose. These techniques permit an attacker to alter the nominal operation of the component in order to obtain confidential information. Firstly, we propose the utilisation of[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Fault injection

  • PHOENIX: Crypto-Agile Hardware Sharing for ML-KEM and HQC, hardware implementation of a PQC accelerator

    • April 25, 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Speaker : Antonio RAS

    The security of the public-key cryptography protecting today and tomorrow’s communication is threatened by the advent of quantum computers. The transition to quantum-safe algorithms has begun: NIST has already standardized ML-KEM, a lattice-based KEM, and marked three code-based KEMs, including HQC, as alternatives for possible future standardization. The relative immaturity of all of these[…]
    • Cryptography

    • SemSecuElec

    • Hardware accelerator

  • Anomalies Mitigation for Horizontal Side Channel Attacks with Unsupervised Neural Networks

    • May 23, 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Speaker : Gauthier Cler - SERMA Safety & Security

    The success of horizontal side-channel attacks heavily depends on the quality of the traces as well as the correct extraction of interest areas, which are expected to contain relevant leakages. If former is insufficient, this will consequently degrade the identification capability of potential leakage candidates and often render attacks inapplicable. This work assess the relevance of neural[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Machine learning

  • Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models

    • June 27, 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Speaker : Julien Maillard - CEA

    Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Hardware reverse

Show previous sessions