Description
In this talk, we will discuss software-induced hardware attacks and their impact for IoT, cloud and mobile security. More specifically, I will introduce SideLine, a new power side-channel attack vector that can be triggered remotely to infer cryptographic secrets. SideLine is based on the intentional misuse of delay-lines components embedded in SoCs that use external memory. I will explain how we exploit the delay-line relationship with on-chip power consumption to capture side-channel leakage, how we collect and store this information and how we use it to conduct power side-channel attacks. Different scenarios will be discussed along with the feasibility of remote hardware attacks in various scenarios.
Next sessions
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CHERI: Architectural Support for Memory Protection and Software Compartmentalization
Speaker : Robert Watson - University of Cambridge
CHERI is a processor architecture protection model enabling fine-grained C/C++ memory protection and scalable software compartmentalization. CHERI hybridizes conventional processor, instruction-set, and software designs with an architectural capability model. Originating in DARPA’s CRASH research program in 2010, the work has progressed from FPGA prototypes to the recently released Arm Morello[…]-
SoSysec
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SemSecuElec
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Compartmentalization
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Hardware architecture
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CHERI standardization and software ecosystem
Speaker : Carl SHAW - CODASIP
This talk will describe the current status of the RISC-V International standardization process to add CHERI as an official extension to RISC-V. It will then explore the current state of CHERI-enabled operating systems, toolchains and software tool development, focusing on the CHERI-RISC-V hardware implementations of CHERI. It will then go on to give likely future development roadmaps and how the[…]-
SoSysec
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SemSecuElec
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Compartmentalization
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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PhaseSCA: Exploiting Phase-Modulated Emanations in Side Channels
Speaker : Pierre Ayoub - LAAS-CNRS
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited. In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase[…]-
Side-channel
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Conformité TEMPEST et compromission d’information au travers de l’arbre d’alimentation d’un équipement
Speaker : Tristan PECHERAU, David HARDY - Thalès
THALES conçoit des équipements cryptographiques et de radiocommunication tactiques, navales et aéronautiques, embarquant des éléments de chiffrement pour la sécurité des communications. Cette sécurité notamment d’un point de vue des émanations électromagnétiques est normée. Ces normes de sécurité de l’information, sont connues sous le nom de code “TEMPEST”, correspondant aux normes OTAN SDIP-27,[…] -
Prise de contrôle d’un infodivertissement automobile à distance
Speaker : Philippe Trebuchet, Guillaume Bouffard - ANSSI
Les véhicules connectés intègrent de nombreuses technologies de communications sans-fil à distance, comme celles exploitant les protocoles Bluetooth ou WiFi. Si le gain en confort d’utilisation et d’interaction est notable, la mise à disposition de ce type d’interfaces augmente les risques en matière de cybersécurité. Dans cet article, nous analysons l’implémentation de la pile Bluetooth embarquée[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Network
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Embedded systems
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