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656 résultats

    • Séminaire

    • SoSysec

    Ransomware Detection Using Markov Chain Models Over File Headers

    • 26 novembre 2021

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Petri/Turing room

    Orateur : David Lubicz (DGA-MI)

    In this paper, a new approach for the detection of ransomware based on the runtime analysis of their behaviour is presented. The main idea is to get samples by using a mini-filter to intercept write requests, then decide if a sample corresponds to a benign or a malicious write request. To do so, in a learning phase, statistical models of structured file headers are built using Markov chains. Then[…]

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Security of Hardware/Software Interfaces : Research Chair of the Cybersecurity Research Cluster

    • 22 juin 2018

    • Centrale-Supelec - Salles Petri/Turing

    Orateur : Guillaume Hiet

    We proposed to host a thematic semester on attacks based on the interaction between software and hardware. The goal would be to host one workshop, one summer school for young researchers, as well as multiple seminars and longer stays for researchers, spanning September 2019 to March or April 2020. This thematic semester will be funded by the DGA in the context of the Cybersecurity Research Cluster[…]

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Calibration Done Right: Noiseless Flush+Flush Attacks

    • 19 mars 2021

    • DGA-IRISA - Web-Conférence

    Orateur : Guillaume Didier

    Caches leak information through timing measurements and so-called side-channel attacks. Several primitives exist with different requirements and trade-offs. Flush+Flush is a stealthy and fast cache attack primitive that uses the timing of the clflush instruction depending on the presence of a line in the cache. However, the CPU interconnect plays a bigger role than thought in these timings, and[…]

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    TRAITOR : a multi clock-glitch attack platform reproducing EMI effects at low-cost

    • 05 avril 2019

    • INRIA - Salles Pétri/Turing

    Orateur : Ludovic Claudepierre

    Electromagnetic injection (EMI) is a common and non-invasive technique used to perform fault attacks. In that case, an electromagnetic wave is radiated by an antenna in the close vicinity of the targeted microcontroller (STM32 in our case).The clock signal is generated thanks to a Phase-Locked-Loop (PLL). The PLL is highly sensitive to EMI and then induces severe disruption on the clock signal[…]

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Unique CAD-compatible SCA-security mechanisms, externally amplified coupling (EAC) attacks and (some) connection

    • 25 juin 2021

    • Bar-Ilan University (BIU) - Web-Conférence

    Orateur : Itamar Levi

    In this seminar I will first discuss unique computer aided design (CAD) compatible SCA security mechanisms. I will present an approach which can significantly increase the physical security-level of a design, be implemented with conventional design-tools and which does not require any special technological-support. The method consists with a correct by-design utilization of power-management[…]

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Bridging Deep Learning and Classical Profiled Side-Channel Attacks

    • 08 avril 2022

    • Thales ITSEF, Toulouse - Salle Pétri/Turing

    Orateur : Gabriel Zaid

    Over the recent years, the cryptanalysis community leveraged the potential of research on Deep Learning to enhance attacks. In particular, several studies have recently highlighted the benefits of Deep Learning based Side-Channel Attacks (DLSCA) to target real-world cryptographic implementations. While this new research area on applied cryptography provides impressive result to recover a secret[…]
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