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698 résultats

    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Is there an L(1/4) algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in algebraic curves?

    • 27 mars 2015

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Maike Massierer - LORIA

    The function field sieve, an algorithm of subexponential complexity L(1/3) that computes discrete logarithms in finite fields, has recently been improved to an L(1/4) algorithm, and subsequently to a quasi-polynomial time algorithm. Since index calculus algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in Jacobians of algebraic curves are based on very similar concepts and results, the natural question[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Beyond the black and grey box

    • 25 avril 2014

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Yoni De Mulder - University of Leuven

    In the white-box attack context, i.e., the setting where an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is executed on an untrusted open platform, the adversary has full access to the implementation and its execution environment. As a result, the adversary is much more powerful than in a traditional black-box environment in which the adversary has only access to the inputs and outputs of a[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    SCREAM/iSCREAM: Side-Channel Resistant Authenticated Encryption with

    • 14 novembre 2014

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : François-Xavier Standaert - Université Catholique de Louvain

    In this talk, I will describe the family of authenticated encryption (with associated data) algorithms SCREAM and iSCREAM. They are based on Liskov et al.'s Tweakable Authenticated Encryption (TAE) mode with the new tweakable block ciphers Scream and iScream. The main desirable features of SCREAM and iSCREAM are:<br/> * A simple and regular design allowing excellent performances on a wide range of[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    How to find low-weight polynomial multiples.

    • 13 juin 2014

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Carl Löndahl - Université de Lund

    We present an improved algorithm for finding low-weight multiples of polynomials over the binary field using coding heoretic methods. The associated code defined by the given olynomial has a cyclic structure, allowing an algorithm to earch for shifts of the sought minimum-weight odeword. Therefore, a code with higher dimension is onstructed, having a larger number of low-weight codewords nd[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Bornes de Weil généralisées pour le nombre de points d'une courbe projective lisse définie sur un corps fini.

    • 16 janvier 2015

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Emmanuel Hallouin - Université de Toulouse 2

    Je commencerai par rappeler l'esprit de la preuve initiale de Weil pour la majoration du nombre de points d'une courbe projective lisse définie sur un corps fini. En particulier, j'insisterai sur le fait qu'elle découle de contraintes euclidiennes dans un espace euclidien bien choisi. Ensuite je montrerai comment cette borne de Weil peut être vue comme la borne d'ordre 1 d'une classe de bornes de[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Keep your friends close with distance-bounding protocols

    • 07 février 2014

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Maria Cristina Onete - IRISA

    Authentication protocols, run between a prover and a verifier, allow the verifier to check the legitimacy of the prover. A legitimate prover should always authenticate (the correctness requirement), while illegitimate parties (adversaries) should not authenticate (the soundness or impersonation resistance requirement). Secure authentication protocols thwart most Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) attacks,[…]