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733 results

    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Binary Edwards Curves for intrinsically secure ECC implementations for the IoT

    • September 07, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Antoine Loiseau (CEA)

    Even if recent advances in public key cryptography tend to focus on algorithms able to survive the post quantum era, at present, there is a urgent need to propose fast, low power and securely implemented cryptography to address the immediate security challenges of the IoT. In this talk, we present a new set of Binary Edwards Curves which have been defined to achieve the highest security levels (up[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure CompilationDespite Dynamic Compromise

    • February 05, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Catalin Hritcu (Inria Paris)

    We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong end-to-end security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion is the first to model dynamic compromise in a system of mutually distrustful components running with least privilege. Each component is protected from all the others until it becomes[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Squirrel: a new approach to computer-assisted proofs of protocols in the computational model.

    • April 16, 2021

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : David Baelde (ENS Cachan)

    Formal methods have brought several approaches for proving that security protocols ensure the expected security and privacy properties. Most of the resulting tools analyze protocols in symbolic models, aka. Dolev-Yao-style models. Security in the symbolic model does not imply security in the cryptographer’s standard model, the computational model, where attackers are arbitrary (PPTIME) Turing[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Private Set Intersection and Other Private Information Sharing Protocols

    • November 07, 2022

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Xavier Carpent (University of Nottingham)

    In this seminar, we will give an overview of Private Set Intersection (PSI), some of its constructions, use cases, and open research questions. The canonical PSI protocol allows Alice and Bob (both with their own set of elements) to interact in a way that Alice learns the intersection of the sets and nothing else. Numerous variants exist:cardinality of intersection only (how many elements in[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    The PINED-RQ Family: Differentially Private Indexes for Range Query Processing in Clouds

    • November 13, 2020

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Tristan Allard (IRISA, Université de Rennes 1)

    Performing non- aggregate range queries on cloud stored data, while achieving both privacy and efficiency is a challenging problem. With the PINED-RQ family of techniques, we propose constructing a differentially private index to an outsourced encrypted dataset. Efficiency is enabled by using a cleartext index structure to perform range queries. Security relies on both differential privacy (of the[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Port Contention Goes Portable: Port Contention Side Channels in Web Browsers

    • May 13, 2022

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Thomas Rokicki (Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA)

    Microarchitectural side-channel attacks can derive secrets from the execution of vulnerable programs. Their implementation in web browsers represents a considerable extension of their attack surface, as a user simply browsing a malicious website, or even a malicious third-party advertisement in a benign cross-origin isolated website, can be a victim.In this talk, we present the first CPU port[…]