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631 résultats

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Measurement the thermal component of clock jitter used as entropy source by TRNGs

    • 28 février 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - IRISA - Salle Aurigny (D165)

    Orateur : Arturo GARAY - STMicroelectronics

    Introduction Measuring the thermal component of clock jitter as an entropy source for True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) is compulsory for the security and evaluation of clock-jitter based TRNGs. However, identifying and isolating the local thermal noise component from other noise sources, particularly flicker noise, while performing a precise measurement remains a challenge. Current[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • TRNG

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Remote data extraction through retroreflector hardware implants

    • 20 décembre 2024 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : François Sarrazin, Pierre Granier - University of Rennes, IETR (UMR 6164)

    Electromagnetic leakage eavesdropping is an increasingly accessible attack vector due to the democratization of software-defined radio. "TEMPEST" attacks rely on passively listening to the unwanted electromagnetic emanations of a target (computer screen, low speed USB peripheral…) in order to retrieve the transmitted data. However, the range and properties of such leakages are unpredictable.[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Euclidean lattice and PMNS: arithmetic, redundancy and equality test

    • 31 janvier 2025 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Fangan Yssouf Dosso - Laboratoire SAS, École des Mines de Saint-Étienne

    The Polynomial Modular Number System (PMNS) is an integer number system that aims to speed up arithmetic operations modulo a prime number p. This system is defined by a tuple (p, n, g, r, E), where p, n, g and r are positive integers, and E is a polynomial with integer coefficients, having g as a root modulo p. Arithmetic operations in PMNS rely heavily on Euclidean lattices. Modular reduction in[…]
    • Séminaire

    • Cryptographie

    Post-quantum Group-based Cryptography

    • 10 janvier 2025 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Delaram Kahrobaei - The City University of New York

    Group-based cryptography is a relatively new family in post-quantum cryptography, with high potential. I will give a general survey of the status of post-quantum group-based cryptography and present some recent results.In the second part of my talk, I speak about Post-quantum hash functions using special linear groups. This hash function is a generalization of Tillich-Zemor hash function as well[…]
    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    I know what your compiler did: Optimization Effects on Power Side-Channel Leakage for RISC-V

    • 24 janvier 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Ileana Buhan - Radboud University Nijmegen

    With the growing prevalence of software-based cryptographic implementations in high-level languages, understanding the role of architectural and micro-architectural components in side-channel security is critical. The role of compilers in case of software implementations towards contribution to side-channel leaks is not investigated. While timing-based side-channel leakage due to compiler effects[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Séminaire

    • SemSecuElec

    Hardware Trojan Horses and Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks: Detection and Mitigation via Hardware-based Methodologies

    • 24 janvier 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Alessandro PALUMBO - CentraleSupélec, IRISA, Inria

    Hardware Trojan Horses that are software-exploitable can be inserted into microprocessors, allowing attackers to run unauthorized code or escalate privileges. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that attackers could observe certain microprocessor features - seemingly unrelated to the program's execution - to exfiltrate secrets or private data. So, even devices produced in secure foundries could[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Micro-architectural vulnerabilities

    • Hardware trojan